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I. INTRODUCTION
While Americans are living longer, older age increases the
likelihood of needing nursing home care. Approximately fortythree percent of people over the age of sixty-five spend at least
1
some time in a nursing facility. Yet with the cost of nursing home
2
care for one year averaging $55,000 in 2002, few Americans can
afford to pay for nursing home care for more than a few months.
For married couples, the cost of an extended nursing home stay for
one spouse can deplete the couple’s lifetime savings, impoverishing
the other spouse.
In 1988, Congress passed the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage
Act (“MCCA”), which included revisions to Medicaid law to prevent
3
the impoverishment of spouses of nursing home residents. These
provisions, known as “spousal impoverishment” rules, govern the
allocation of income and resources between the institutionalized
4
spouse and the spouse living in the community. The purpose of
the spousal impoverishment provisions of MCCA was to protect the
community spouse, typically the wife, from being forced into
5
poverty as a result of the overwhelming cost of nursing home care.
In the 2001 term, the United States Supreme Court reviewed
one of the provisions of MCCA regarding the asset limit for a
couple when one spouse resides in the nursing home and the other
lives in the community. The case of Wisconsin Department of Health
6
and Family Services v. Blumer involved a challenge to the state’s
procedure for allocating income and assets between the spouses.
The federal Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”)
gave the states wide latitude to interpret the law in the manner least
7
costly to the state. In a decision highly deferential to the
interpretation of the federal government, six Justices disregarded

1. Enid Kassner, Foreword to WILLIAM H. CROWN, ET AL.,
OF ASSET TESTING FOR NURSING HOME B ENEFITS, at i (1994).
2. AARP, BEYOND 50.02: A REPORT TO THE NATION ON

AARP, AN ANALYSIS

TRENDS IN HEALTH
SECURITY 87 (2002),
http://www.aarp.org/beyond50/graphics/pdfs/beyond50_02three.pdf
[hereinafter BEYOND 50.02].
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5 (1994 Supp. V.).
4. Wisconsin Dep’t. of Health & Family Serv. v. Blumer, 534 U.S. 473, ___,
122 S. Ct. 962, 966 (2002).
5. H.R. REP. NO. 100-105(II), at 65 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
857, 888.
6. 534 U.S. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 966.
7. Id. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 970 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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the clear language and legislative history of MCCA. The Court
permitted the federal agency to ignore one of the protections for
9
community spouses contained in Medicaid law. The willingness of
the High Court to disregard statutory protections for elderly
spouses and to defer to the interpretation of the Medicaid statute
by government agencies seeking to minimize their Medicaid
budgets reflects a lack of judicial will to protect the rights of the
poor.
II. AN EXTENDED NURSING HOME STAY FOR ONE SPOUSE
FREQUENTLY IMPOVERISHES THE OTHER SPOUSE
A. Most Older Americans Require Medicaid Assistance to Finance
Nursing Home Costs of More Than a Few Months
In 1900, life expectancy in the United States was forty-six
10
11
years. In 1997, the average American lived 76.5 years. In the
twentieth century, the rate of growth of the elderly American
population greatly exceeded the growth rate of the population of
the country as a whole, and people eighty-five years and older were
12
the fastest growing segment of the elderly population.
The likelihood of needing long-term care in a nursing home
13
increases with age. As chronological age increases, people have a
greater probability of having multiple chronic illnesses, therefore
14
requiring longer stays in nursing homes. While the American
population is living longer, many elderly people “live their
15
increased years with multiple illnesses and disabilities.” In 1990,
almost a quarter of Americans eighty-five years of age and older

8. Id. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 980 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
9. Id.
10. ARTHUR KORNHABER, CONTEMPORARY GRANDPARENTING 10 (1996).
11. DONNA L. HOYERT ET AL., CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
47 NATIONAL VITAL STATISTICS REPORTS 19, 1 (1999).
12. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’ T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION
REPORTS, SERIES P23-194, POPULATION PROFILE OF THE UNITED STATES: 1997 50
(1998).
13. See generally Joshua M. Wiener et al., Catastrophic Costs of Long-term Care for
Elderly Americans, in PERSONS WITH DISABILITITES 196 (Joshua M. Wiener et al., eds.,
1995) [hereinafter Catastrophic Costs] (discussing costs of elder care).
14. FRANK B. HOBBS & BONNIE L. DAMON, U.S. DEP’ T OF COMMERCE, P23-190,
CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS:
65+ IN THE UNITED STATES 3-14, 3-17,
http://www.census.gov/prod/1/pop/p23-190/p23-190.html.
15. Id. at 3-14.
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resided in nursing homes, and ninety percent of all nursing home
16
residents were over sixty-five years of age.
Few Americans can afford to spend more than a short period
of time in a nursing home. At well over $50,000 per year and
increasing with the rapid inflation of health care services, the cost
of living at a nursing home for a long period of time would
17
bankrupt most older Americans. Neither Medicare nor private
health insurance covers any substantial degree of long-term care
18
services. Medicare covers primarily short-term stays (100 days or
less in a benefit period) in skilled nursing facilities following a
19
hospital stay. Private long-term care insurance accounts for less
20
than one percent of the financing for long-term care. Only a
small percentage of the wealthiest Americans have purchased
private long-term insurance policies that pay for long-term care in
21
nursing homes.
Approximately seventy percent of nursing home residents rely
22
on Medicaid to help pay for their nursing home care. More than
one million individuals received Medicaid assistance in paying for
23
nursing home care in 1996. Medicaid, a jointly financed statefederal program designed to pay a portion of health care costs for
needy persons of all ages, is the largest source of public financing
24
for nursing home care in this country. Indeed, Medicaid is “our
nation’s primary response to the long-term care needs of its

16. Id. at 3-14, 6-9.
17. Jan Ellen Rein, Misinformation and Self-Deception in Recent long-Term Care
Policy Trends, 12 J.L. & POLITICS 195, 210 (Spring 1996).
18. Wiener et al., supra note 13, at 182-83.
19. Id. at 182.
20. Id.
21. See generally ENID KASSNER & LEE SHIREY, AARP, M EDICAID FINANCIAL
ELIGIBILITY FOR OLDER PEOPLE: STATE VARIATIONS IN ACCESS TO HOME AND
COMMUNITY-BASED WAIVER AND NURSING HOME SERVICES 1 (2000), available at
http://research.aarp.org/health/2000_06_medicaid_1.html (stating few older
individuals have purchased private long-term care insurance policies that pay for
these services).
22. JOSHUA M. WIENER ET AL., CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE LIBRARY
OF CONGRESS, STATE COST CONTAINMENT INITIATIVES FOR LONG-TERM CARE SERVICES
FOR OLDER PEOPLE, CRS-1 (2000) [hereinafter STATE COST CONTAINMENT], available
at newfederalism.urban.org/health_policy.html; JOSHUA M. WIENER ET AL., AARP,
SPENDING DOWN TO M EDICAID: NEW DATA ON THE ROLE OF M EDICAID IN PAYING FOR
NURSING HOME CARE 1 (1996) [hereinafter SPENDING DOWN].
23. KASSNER & SHIREY, supra note 21, at 11.
24. Marshall B. Kapp, Options for Long-Term Care Financing: A Look to the Future,
42 HASTINGS L.J. 719, 724 (1991).
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25

citizens.”
Medicaid has stringent income and asset limits that exclude all
but the poorest Americans. However, due to the exorbitant costs of
nursing home care, many older Americans become impoverished
when they require extended long-term care. While the elderly are
not a majority of this country’s impoverished citizens, older persons
are much more likely to become impoverished by nursing home
costs. Not only are older Americans more likely to require nursing
home care, but also the fixed incomes and limited earnings
potential of older Americans make it harder for them to recover
from the financial blow of nursing home expenses.
Approximately 9.7% of the nation’s poor in 1999 were over
age sixty-five. In addition to the older Americans living below the
poverty level, many elderly households are just above the brink of
poverty. In 1999, 6.1% of people sixty-five years of age and older
26
were just above poverty but below 125% of poverty. An additional
20.1 % of people over age sixty-five were between 125% and 200%
27
of the poverty level. The elderly are less likely than other adults to
28
move out of poverty, due to the fixed nature of elderly incomes.
Similarly, the elderly are less likely than younger adults to be
29
able to replace the assets that they spend. So, if an elderly couple
spends almost all their assets on nursing home care for one spouse,
there is little likelihood of replenishing those assets to support the
other spouse.
Most elderly couples do not possess sufficient assets to pay for
even a year of nursing home care for only one spouse. Excluding
30
the value of home equity, the median net worth for married
31
couple households over sixty-five years of age in 1995 was $47,741.
25. KASSNER & SHIREY, supra note 21, at 1.
26. AARP, BEYOND 50: A REPORT TO THE NATION ON ECONOMIC SECURITY 28
(2001), http://www.aarp.org/beyond50/2001home.html [hereinafter BEYOND
50].
27. Id.
28. Id. at 30; HOBBS & DAMON, supra note 14, at 4-16, 4-21, 4-22.
29. HOBBS & DAMON, supra note 14, at 4-23.
30. The home is an excluded asset in determining Medicaid eligibility.
SPENDING DOWN, supra note 22, at 28; 42 U.S.C. § 1382(b)(1)(2002); 42 U.S.C. §
1396r-5(c)(5) (2002). Therefore, in determining whether a couple is eligible for
Medicaid, the state will not consider the value of the couple’s home. After the
death of both spouses, federal law permits the state to seek recovery of its
Medicaid expenditures, including seeking reimbursement from real property that
had been owned by the institutionalized spouse, such as the couple’s residence.
42 U.S.C. § 1396p(b) (2002); 42 C.F.R. § 433.36 (2002).
31. M ICHAEL E. DAVERN & PATRICIA J. FISHER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’ T
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Minority households, specifically black and Hispanic households,
have significantly less assets than white households and are even
32
less able to afford the steep cost of nursing home care.
Middle class people who have been financially independent all
of their lives often begin their stay in nursing homes paying on
their own for their care. In 1993, about one-half of nursing home
33
care expenses were paid out of pocket by older Americans. If
older persons are discharged in a few months, they often do not
seek Medicaid eligibility. Yet, if their care lasts longer, many
residents are forced to spend a lifetime of savings, impoverishing
themselves prior to obtaining government assistance to pay for
34
their care. Indeed, due to the spend down requirements of
Medicaid, beginning in 1985 and continuing afterwards, the
average older person spent more personal money, both in absolute
dollars and as a percentage of income, on total heath care than she
35
did prior to the enactment of Medicare and Medicaid in 1965.
Nearly all individuals with disabilities prefer home and
36
community based long-term care services to nursing home care.
An AARP survey of persons age fifty and older conducted in 2001
found that seventy-five percent of the people surveyed preferred to
receive care in their homes, in the event of a disability requiring
help with everyday activities. A significant minority of fifteen
percent would prefer care in an assisted living or similar residential
setting. Only four percent of the people surveyed stated that their
first choice for receiving care would be a nursing home. Even
when asked about a disability requiring twenty-four-hour care,
twenty-five percent of respondents preferred care in the home,
COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: HOUSEHOLD NET WEALTH AND ASSET
OWNERSHIP: 1995 at xvii tbl. I (2001),
http://www.census.gov/prod/www/abs/popula.html at P70-71. Additional data
regarding net wealth and asset ownership, as it fluctuated between 1995 and 1998,
can be found in the Federal Reserve Board’s Survey of Consumer Finances. See
generally ARTHUR B. KENNICKELL ET AL., FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, RECENT CHANGES
IN U.S. FAMILY FINANCES: RESULTS FROM THE 1998 SURVEY OF CONSUMER FINANCES,
Fed. Reserve Bull. (January 2000),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2000/0100lead.pdf
(clicking
search, entering “recent changes in U.S. family finances,” and selecting paragraph
5 on search results page).
32. DAVERN & FISHER, supra note 31, at xv fig. 6; BEYOND 50, supra note 26, at
46; HOBBS & DAMON, supra note 14, at 4-25.
33. Catastrophic Costs, supra note 13, at 183.
34. See SPENDING DOWN, supra note 22, at 19.
35. Kapp, supra note 24, at 726.
36. KASSNER & SHIREY, supra note 21, at 13; Kapp, supra note 24, at 728.
OF
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twenty-three percent would seek care in an assisted living setting,
37
and only twelve percent desired nursing home care.
However, Medicaid coverage of home and community based
long-term care services is optional for the states, and in many
locations, the financial eligibility criteria for such services are even
38
more restrictive than they are for nursing home coverage.
Medicare does not cover long-term care in the home, and only a
small number of the wealthiest Americans have purchased longterm care insurance to provide assistance with the costs of long39
term care in the home.
Long-term care services in the home are quite expensive. The
median basic rate for assisted living ranges from $21,600 to
$26,300, including meals but excluding transportation, assistance
40
with medication, and therapy. The average cost of a home health
aide in 2002 was eighteen dollars per hour, while a licensed
practical nurse charged an average hourly rate of thirty-seven
41
dollars per hour.
Many households expend their savings purchasing home- and
community-based care. For example, most moderate and lowincome persons age seventy-five and older can not afford assisted
42
living unless they use their assets to help pay for the costs. Two
studies of spend down patterns for long-term care found that even
more people exhaust their assets on home- and community-based
43
services than do so for nursing home care. Many people who
receive Medicaid in nursing homes have already exhausted their
assets to obtain community based care. Since community-based
care is highly preferred over nursing home care, it is unlikely that
people with large amounts of wealth would seek nursing home care
before spending considerable resources on home- and communitybased care.
The overwhelming majority of nursing home residents who
spend down their assets to qualify for Medicaid are age sixty-five
44
and older.
One commentator observed: “Impoverishment
resulting from extended nursing home stays has, in effect, become
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

BEYOND 50.02, supra note 2, at 57.
See KASSNER & SHIREY, supra note 21, at ii.
BEYOND 50.02, supra note 2, at 58.
Id. at 88, 117 n.144.
Id. at 87, 117 n.141.
STATE COST CONTAINMENT, supra note 22, at CRS-14.
SPENDING DOWN, supra note 22, at 28.
Id. at 19.
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45

a normal risk of aging.” Another commentator remarked that
“the vast majority” of elderly Americans “are at an appreciable risk
of exhausting their life savings to cover an extended stay” in a
46
nursing home. Medicaid is “a substantial safety net” for middle
class people who are impoverished by the high costs of long-term
47
care.
B. After the Death of the Institutionalized Spouse, the Surviving
Spouse is Likely to Have Decreased Income as well as Depleted
Assets
Individuals who die while in nursing home care are
significantly more likely to have experienced longer nursing home
48
stays than those who are discharged alive.
Therefore, the
economic situation of the surviving spouse is especially precarious
after the death of a spouse who was institutionalized in a nursing
home. The couple probably expended significant assets on nursing
home care for the institutionalized spouse, and the surviving
spouse’s income is likely to decrease dramatically after the
institutionalized spouse’s death.
Women tend to live longer than men and are more likely to be
49
the surviving spouse. In 1999, thirty-two percent of women over
age fifty-five were widowed compared to only nine percent of men
50
of comparable age. As women age, the likelihood that they will be
widowed increases rapidly. Seventy-seven percent of women eighty51
five years and older are widows.
The average period of
widowhood (i.e. the average number of years a woman lives past the
52
death of her husband) is eleven years. After the death of her
husband, a woman needs sufficient income and assets to sustain
her for an average of eleven years.
45. Catastrophic Costs, supra note 13, at 183.
46. Rein, supra note 17, at 254.
47. SPENDING DOWN, supra note 22, at 29; STATE COST CONTAINMENT, supra
note 22, at CRS-1.
48. Catastrophic Costs, supra note 13, at 196.
49. DENISE SMITH & HAVA TILLIPMAN, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’ T OF
COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS: THE OLDER POPULATION IN THE UNITED
STATES: MARCH 1999 1 (2000), http://www.census.gov/prod/2000pubs/p20532.pdf at P20-532. In 1999, the ratio of men to women age 55 and over was 81
men to 100 women. The male-female ratio drops steadily with age. For Americans
age 85 and over, the male-female ratio was 49 men to 100 women. Id.
50. Id. at 3.
51. Id.
52. Rein, supra note 17, at 218.
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The poorest segment of the elderly population is comprised of
unmarried (or widowed) women, and the likelihood of
impoverishment increases with age. In 1999, 13.4% of unmarried
women over sixty-five years of age lived in poverty, as did 9.7% of
unmarried men over sixty-five. In contrast, approximately five
percent of married couple families sixty-five and over lived in
53
poverty. Women who are widowed are at a much higher risk of
living in poverty.
Both older men and women living alone (most of whom are
widowed) have significantly fewer assets than older married
couples, likely reflecting the spending of those assets on medical
54
care or long-term care for the spouse who died. While married
couple households over age sixty-five had a median net worth
(excluding home equity) of $47,741 in 1995, single men over age
sixty-five had a median net worth of $15,374, and single women
55
over age sixty-five had a median net worth of $11,100. Thus, after
the death of a spouse, the surviving spouse has few assets to finance
his or her own medical and long-term care.
Moreover, after the death of an institutionalized husband, the
wife’s pension and Social Security benefits are likely to be
inadequate to meet her needs. “[T]he average household income
of married women falls sharply in the United States when their
husbands die, even when income measures are adjusted for the
56
reduced consumption needs of the now smaller household unit.”
Fewer women than men receive an annuity or pension, and
the average pension amount is significantly lower for women than
for men. In 1995, 46.4% of men over age sixty-five received annuity
and/or pension income averaging $11,460, compared to only
26.4% of women over age 65 who received an annuity or pension,
57
with an average pension of $6,684. While widows constituted the
largest proportion of women over age fifty receiving annuities
and/or pensions, “widows received the lowest mean and median

53. SMITH & TILLIPMAN, supra note 49, at 5.
54. See Cathleen D. Zick & Karen Holden, An Assessment of the Wealth Holdings
of Recent Widows, 55 J. GERONTOLOGY: SOCIAL SCIENCES S90, S96 (2000) (discussing
finances of the elderly population).
55. DAVERN & FISHER, supra note 31, at xvii tbl. 1.
56. Karen C. Holden & Cathleen Zick, Insuring Against the Consequences of
Widowhood in a Reformed Social Security System, in FRAMING THE SOCIAL SECURITY
DEBATE 157 (R. Douglas Arnold et al. eds., 1998).
57. KEN M CDONNE ET AL., EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH INSTITUTE, EBRI
DATABOOK ON EMPLOYEE BENEFITS G3 (1997).
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annuity and/or pension amounts of women of any marital status.”
Census Bureau data from 1990 to 1992 show that only fifty-nine
percent of the widows of pensioners received any post-widowhood
pension and post-widowhood pension income was seventy-one
59
percent of the husband’s pre-widowhood pension income. Also,
since private pensions usually are not indexed to inflation, real
60
pension income declines over time.
In addition, Census Bureau data show that Social Security
benefits declined by almost forty percent from the pre- to postwidowhood period among women widowed during the early part of
61
the 1990s. For a single-earner couple, during the lifetime of the
working spouse, the retired worker receives a Social Security
retired-worker benefit, and the nonworking spouse receives a
benefit equal to fifty percent of that amount. After the death of the
retired-worker spouse, the widow will be paid a benefit equal to the
deceased worker’s benefit, which amounts to only two-thirds of the
combined pre-widowhood benefit. For a two-earner couple in
which the spouses have identical covered-earnings history, after the
death of a spouse, the surviving spouse receives only her own
retired-worker benefit without any additional payments to
compensate for the loss of the deceased spouse’s benefits. For this
two-earner couple, the post-widowhood Social Security income is
62
only half of the pre-widowhood income.
In order for a widow to maintain the same standard of living as
when both spouses were alive, she needs to receive eighty percent
63
of the couple’s pre-widowhood income. However, most widows
do not receive eighty percent of the couple’s income, since both
their pensions and Social Security incomes drop dramatically after
the death of the spouse. As a result, “many married women face a
significantly increased risk of poverty following the death of their
64
husbands.”
III. MCCA INCLUDED A “RESOURCES FIRST” RULE, DESIGNED TO
PROTECT THE COMMUNITY SPOUSE’ S ASSETS, BUT SOME LOWER
58. Id.
59. Holden & Zick, supra note 56, at 166.
60. Rein, supra note 17, at 253.
61. Holden & Zick, supra note 56, at 165-66.
62. Id. at 159.
63. Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, The Impact of Social Security
Reform on Women’s Economic Security, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 375, 384 (1999).
64. Id.
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COURTS DISREGARDED ITS MANDATE
A. Congress’s Intent in Enacting MCCA was to End Spousal
Impoverishment
The legislative history of MCCA demonstrates that in 1988
Congress sought to redress the devastating financial impact of
nursing home costs on the community spouse. The House Report
states:
The leading cause of financial catastrophe among the
elderly is the need for long-term care, especially the need
for nursing home placement. The expense of nursing
home care—which can range from $2,000 to $3,000 per
month or more—has the potential for rapidly depleting
the lifetime savings of all but the wealthiest . . . .The
purpose of the Committee bill is to end this pauperization by
assuring that the community spouse has a sufficient—but
not excessive—amount of income and resources available
to her while her spouse is in a nursing home at Medicaid
expense. This will be of particular benefit to older
women, who, in the current generation at risk of nursing
home care, have often worked at home all their lives
raising families and have limited
income other than their
65
husbands’ pension checks.
The House Report noted that the inadequate maintenance
levels for community spouses had forced community spouses to sue
the institutionalized spouses for support, and that in some cases the
“financial duress” of the low maintenance levels had resulted in
“the premature institutionalization” of the spouse who had been
66
residing in the community. The Report continues:
The Committee bill would end spousal impoverishment. It
revises the current Federal requirements relating to
attribution of income, attribution of resources, transfer of
resources, and post-eligibility application of income.
These revisions are limited to the context of a couple with
one spouse in an institution who applies for or receives
Medicaid. The purpose of these revisions is to assure that
the community spouse in these circumstances has income
65. H.R. REP. NO. 100-105(II), at 65 (1988) (emphasis added), reprinted in
1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 857, 888.
66. H.R. REP. NO. 100-105(I), at 69 (emphasis added), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 892.
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and resources
sufficient to live with independence and
67
dignity.
The Senate expressed similar concern for the plight of spouses
of nursing home residents and its intent to remedy spousal
impoverishment. In discussing the conference report on MCCA,
Senator Kerry was especially concerned about couples who had
sought court orders of support for the community spouse through
the divorce courts, utilizing the divorce process in order to protect
the community spouse from impoverishment. Senator Kerry
stated:
I am also very pleased that the conference report
addresses the issue of spousal impoverishment and
contains much needed protections against asset and
income depletion. There is absolutely no reason why a
couple married for 30 years must even consider getting a
divorce to protect the wife’s income and assets while the
husband impoverishes himself to qualify for Medicaid
funded nursing home care. This is immoral–this is not
America–this is an abomination. And, this
legislation will
68
eliminate the need for its consideration.
The many statements of support in the Senate for MCCA’s
spousal impoverishment provisions included the statement of
Senator Reid:
Spousal impoverishment is a very serious national
problem. The term “spousal impoverishment” refers to
the far too familiar situation affecting many, many older
couples. It occurs when a spouse enters a nursing home,
for example, and the couple must forfeit their entire
savings to qualify for Medicaid coverage. This is a
significant statement, Madam President. A person enters
an extended care facility, a nursing home, and the couple
must forfeit their entire savings to even qualify for
Medicaid coverage. The act now before us provides for
protection for the non-institutionalized persons whose spouse’s
69
nursing home costs are being paid for by Medicaid.

67. Id.
68. 135 CONG. REC. S7386, S7408-S7409 (daily ed. June 8, 1988) (statement of
Sen. Kerry).
69. Id. at S7402 (statement of Sen. Reid) (emphasis added).
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B. MCCA Provides for the Community Spouse to Retain Resources
During the Initial Application Period if Her Income is Below a
Minimum Level
MCCA sought to protect the community spouse by ensuring
that she retained sufficient income and resources to avoid
impoverishment. Prior to MCCA, the couple could own no more
than $2,000 in resources in order for the institutionalized spouse to
70
receive Medicaid. MCCA revised Medicaid law to permit the
community spouse to retain a greater share of the couple’s
resources. Under MCCA, the community spouse is permitted to
retain half of the couple’s resources up to a specified limit, known
as the Community Spouse Resource Allowance (CSRA), while the
institutionalized spouse is required to spend down his or her share
71
of the couple’s assets to the $2,000 amount. The exact amount of
CSRA is set by the state, but must be within the minimum and
maximum levels established by federal law and indexed with
72
inflation. In 2001, the minimum CSRA was $17,400 and the
73
maximum CSRA was $87,000. More than half the states set their
74
CSRA at the minimum level permitted by federal law.
An example will clarify how the CSRA works. Assume the state
has chosen the minimum CSRA (for 2001) of $17,400, and the
husband is the institutionalized spouse. Our hypothetical couple is
presumed to own $50,000 in non-excluded resources (just above
75
the average). Since the couple’s resources exceed the $17,400
CSRA chosen by the state, $25,000 will be attributed to each
spouse. The husband will be entitled to Medicaid benefits
(focusing on resources only) when his share of the resources is
reduced to $2,000. Thus, the couple must expend $23,000 of the
husband’s designated resources on the nursing home care of the
husband before he will be eligible for Medicaid.
MCCA also contained provisions to protect the income of the
community spouse. The community spouse is allocated a
Minimum Monthly Maintenance Needs Allowance (“MMMNA”),
set by federal law at a minimum of 150% of the federal poverty
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Rein, supra note 17, at 217.
42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(c), (d), and (f) (2002); 20 C.F.R. § 416.1205 (2002).
Id.
Blumer, 534 U.S. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 968.
WILLIAM H. CROWN ET AL., AARP, AN ANALYSIS OF ASSET TESTING FOR
NURSING HOME BENEFITS, at 45 (1994).
75. DAVERN & FISHER, supra note 31, at xvii tbl. I.
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level for a family unit of two plus a possible excess shelter allowance
(if the community spouse can establish the need for the
allowance). The maximum MMMNA was set at $1,500 in the
76
original 1988 law. For 2001, the maximum MMMNA was $2,175
77
per month. States set the actual MMMNA between the federal
78
minimum and maximum amounts. A majority of states set the
79
MMMNA at the minimum amount permitted by federal law.
If the community spouse’s income is insufficient to produce
income equal to or exceeding the MMMNA, then the couple may
request a fair hearing and seek to keep additional assets to
generate additional income and bring the community spouse up to
80
the basic income level of the MMMNA. The revision of the CSRA
to generate additional income is authorized by 42 U.S.C. § 1396r5(e)(2)(C), which states:
Revision of community spouse resource allowance. If
either such spouse establishes that the community spouse
resource allowance (in relation to the amount of income
generated by such an allowance) is inadequate to raise the
community spouse’s income to the minimum monthly
maintenance needs allowance, there shall be substituted,
for the community spouse resource allowance under
subsection (f)(2), an amount adequate to provide81such a
minimum monthly maintenance needs allowance.
The Blumer case concerned whether the revision of CSRA
82
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(e)(2)(C) is mandatory. Irene
Blumer was institutionalized in a nursing home and sought
83
Medicaid benefits to pay for her care. Her husband, Burnett
Blumer, resided in the community, and his income was twenty-five
84
dollars below the minimum income level of the state MMMNA.
The Blumers contended that the state was required to revise the
CSRA as set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(e)(2)(C) to permit
Burnett to retain additional resources to generate the minimum
85
income of the MMMNA.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(d)(3)(c), and (g) (2002).
Blumer, 534 U.S. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 967.
42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(d)(3).
CROWN, supra note 74, at 46-49.
42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(e)(2).
42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(e)(2)(C).
Blumer, 534 U.S. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 964.
Id. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 970.
Id.
Id. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 972-73.
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The state of Wisconsin, supported by the federal agency, HHS,
sought to utilize a different procedure to make up for the shortfall
86
in Burnett’s income. The state’s approach would allocate income
from the institutionalized spouse to the community spouse,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(d), instead of permitting the
community spouse to retain additional resources to generate the
additional income. This approach is known as “income first,”
allocating income before increasing the CSRA. The Blumers’
approach is known as “resources first,” in which the CSRA is
adjusted before allocating income from the institutionalized spouse
87
to the community spouse.
The “resources first” approach permits couples to obtain
Medicaid eligibility sooner, because they do not have to expend as
88
much of their resources to qualify under the resource limit.
Under the “income first” method, the couple must expend more
89
resources to qualify for Medicaid.
Importantly, after the death of the institutionalized spouse, the
community spouse is much more likely to be impoverished when
an “income first” method is utilized as compared to the “resources
first” method. The “income first” rule forces the community
spouse, most commonly the wife, to spend down the couple’s assets
and live on her husband’s income during his lifetime. Yet, after the
husband’s death, his pension or Social Security income, or a
90
significant portion of it, may no longer be available to her. As a
result, the “income first” rule greatly increases the risk that the
community spouse will be impoverished after the death of the
institutionalized spouse. In contrast, the “resources first” rule helps
to reduce the pauperization of the community spouse, since it
preserves assets for her support after the institutionalized spouse
has died. Thus, the “resources first” rule is consistent with the
purpose of MCCA, i.e. to protect the community spouse from
impoverishment.
However, from the vantage point of the government, the
“income first” approach is desirable, because it results in lower
Medicaid expenditures.
In the Blumer case, the federal
government’s brief projected that the additional annual cost of the
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.

Id. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 970.
Id. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 969.
Id.
Id.
See supra Part II.B.
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“resources first” method for Wisconsin was $10 million. The state
and federal government both contribute to the payment of
Medicaid expenditures. Not surprisingly, given the predicted
additional costs, a majority of states utilized the “income first”
92
approach when the Blumer case went before the Supreme Court.
C. Some Lower Courts Ignored the Plain Language and Legislative
History of MCCA in Upholding the “Income First” Approach
Medicaid applicants in numerous states challenged states’ use
of the “income first” method. Applicants argued that the CSRA
adjustment pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(e)(2)(C) occurs during
a fair hearing process that determines initial eligibility, while the
attribution of income permitted by 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(d) is
applicable only after the applicant is found eligible for Medicaid.
The section pertaining to the attribution of income states:
Protecting income for community spouse. (1) Allowances
to be offset from income of institutionalized spouse. After
an institutionalized spouse is determined or redetermined to be
eligible for medical assistance, in determining the amount of
the spouse’s income that is to be applied monthly to
payment for the costs of care in the institution, there shall
be deducted from the spouse’s monthly income the
following amounts in the following order: (A) A personal
needs allowance. . . .(B)
A community spouse monthly
93
income allowance. . . .
Therefore, applicants argued, according to the clear language
of the statute, the attribution of income from the institutionalized
spouse to the community spouse could not be utilized to deny
initial eligibility and could only occur after the institutionalized
spouse was found eligible for Medicaid. In other words, applicants
contended that the “resources first” approach was mandated by the
statute.
91. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae (on Petition for Writ of
Certiorari) at 11, Wisconsin Dep’t. of Health & Family Servs. v. Blumer, 534 U.S.
473, 122 S. Ct. 962 (2002) (No. 00-952). The Blumers’ answering brief disputed
the government’s estimate of the cost of the “resources first” method. The
Blumers challenged the assumptions underlying the government’s calculations,
and the Blumers asserted that the government’s estimates were greatly
exaggerated.
Respondent’s Brief In Opposition (on Petition for Writ of
Certiorari) at 9-10, Blumer (No. 00-952).
92. Brief for the United States, supra note 91, at 11.
93. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(d) (2002) (emphasis added).
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Two federal courts of appeals and two state courts rejected the
applicants’ arguments in support of “resources first” and upheld
94
the legality of the states’ “income first” method. The Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit reasoned that the “resources first”
approach would render the allocation of income set forth in 42
95
U.S.C. § 1396r-5(d) “superfluous.” The Third Circuit’s decision
did not address the statute’s scheme of requiring adjustment of
resources prior to an eligibility determination and limiting the
attribution of income in section (d) until after a finding of
eligibility. By ignoring the timeframe set forth in the statute for
adjusting resources pre-eligibility and attributing income posteligibility, the Third Circuit was able to conclude that the “income
96
first” method was permissible.
Moreover, the Third Circuit
deferred to the opinion of the federal agency, HHS, contained
merely in opinion letters and not in regulations, that “income first”
97
was permitted by the Medicaid statute. The court opined that this
result comported with the purpose of MCCA “by preserving as
98
many Medicaid resources as possible.” The court stated that
MCCA was not intended to be a final solution to spousal
impoverishment, disregarding the legislative history of MCCA that
99
stated Congress’ intent to end spousal impoverishment.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, the state’s
highest court, similarly concluded that “income first” was permitted
100
by the Medicaid statute. The Massachusetts court acknowledged
that the attribution of income provision, set forth in 42 U.S.C. §
1396r-5(d), applied “after” eligibility was determined, but then
stated that the “fair meaning” of the statute was that the attribution
of income was not limited “only” to post-eligibility
101
determinations. Thus, the court ignored the plain meaning of
94. Cleary v. Waldman, 167 F.3d 801, 808 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 870
(1999); Chambers v. Ohio Dep’t of Human Servs., 145 F.3d 793, 802 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 964 (1998); Thomas v. Comm’r of the Div. of Med. Assistance,
682 N.E.2d 874, 879 (Mass. 1997); Golf v. New York State Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 697
N.E.2d 555, 662-63 (N.Y. 1998).
95. Cleary, 167 F.3d at 809.
96. Id. at 809-12.
97. Id. at 811-12.
98. Id. at 811.
99. Compare id. at 810, with H.R. REP. NO. 100-105(II), at 65, 69 (1988),
reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 857, 888, 893.
100. Thomas, 682 N.E.2d at 879.
101. Id. (quoting Holbrook v. Randolph, 374 Mass. 437, 440-41 (1978)). The
Court of Appeals of New York similarly stated that the federal statute did not
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the word “after” and disregarded the text limiting income
102
attribution to the post-eligibility period. The Massachusetts court
acknowledged that “the income deemed to the community spouse
from the institutionalized spouse was not guaranteed on the death
of the latter,” but concluded that permitting the community spouse
to retain resources would “subvert” the “purpose of MCCA, which
was to require couples to bear a reasonable amount of the cost of
103
institutionalized care and thus preserve Medicaid resources.”
Like the Third Circuit, the Massachusetts court was more
concerned with lowering Medicaid expenditures than with ending
104
spousal impoverishment.
Neither court cited any passage of
MCCA legislative history in support of their characterization of the
105
purpose of MCCA. The courts’ statements that the goal of the
spousal impoverishment provisions of MCCA was to preserve
Medicaid resources is factually incorrect; so, it is not surprising that
the courts do not cite any passage of the MCCA legislative history in
support of their claim.
Nevertheless, Congress did seek to dramatically reduce
Medicaid expenditures when it passed the Omnibus Budget
106
Reconciliation Act of 1993 (“OBRA 1993”). In hearings before
the Health and Environment Subcommittee of the United States
House of Representatives’ Committee on Energy and Commerce,
the chairman of the subcommittee, Congressman Waxman, made
this objective clear. Congressman Waxman stated that the Clinton
administration had requested that the Committee reduce federal
Medicaid outlays by $7.8 billion over the next five fiscal years,
107
dwarfing the $2.9 billion in cuts in 1981 under President Reagan.
specify whether an income transfer was to occur prior to an eligibility
determination or post-eligibility, ignoring the word “after” in 42 U.S.C. § 1396r5(d).
102. Id. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit relied upon Thomas in
reaching the conclusion that a transfer of income may occur prior to an eligibility
determination. Chambers v. Ohio Dep’t of Human Serv., 145 F.3d 793, 802 (6th
Cir., cert. denied, 525 U.S. 964 (1998)). The Court of Appeals of New York similarly
stated that the federal statute did not specify whether an income transfer was to
occur prior to an eligibility determination or post-eligibility, ignoring the word
“after” in 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(d). Golf v. New York State Dep’t of Soc. Serv., 697
N.E.2d 555, 562 (N.Y. 1998).
103. Thomas, 682 N.E.2d at 880-81.
104. Id.
105. See Chambers, 167 F.3d at 793; Thomas, 682 N.E. 2d at 880-81.
106. Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312 (1993).
107. Ira S. Wiesner, OBRA ‘93 and Medicaid: Asset Transfers, Trust Availability,
and Estate Recovery Statutory Analysis in Context, 19 NOVA L. REV. 679, 683-84 n.18
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To accomplish this goal, OBRA 1993 increased the number of
months of ineligibility for transferring assets, placed restrictions on
wealth sequestered in trust arrangements, and enhanced state
recovery of Medicaid expenditures from deceased Medicaid
108
recipients’ estates.
Yet, OBRA 1993 made no changes to the procedures for
revising the CSRA and attributing income, and therefore the 1993
law is irrelevant to the question of whether the “resources first”
method is required by MCCA. The courts imputed the legislative
history of OBRA 1993, specifically the objective of reducing
Medicaid expenditures, to MCCA, but in fact, MCCA did not seek
to diminish Medicaid spending. The courts’ distortion of the
legislative history and the clear terms of MCCA is best understood
as judicial deference to governments seeking to expend less on lowincome seniors and as judicial insensitivity to the plight of older
Americans who require long-term care.
Three state courts, including the Court of Appeals of
Wisconsin in the Blumer case, held that the “resources first”
109
approach was mandated by MCCA. All three decisions focused
on the statutory language requiring a revision of the CSRA prior to
a decision on eligibility and limiting the attribution of income until
110
after a determination of eligibility. These decisions concluded
that the unambiguous language of the statute mandates the
“resources first” approach and does not permit the “income first”
111
method.
The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in two
federal appellate cases which held that the “income first”

(1995).
108. Id. at 681. The long-term care industry lobbied for restrictions on
Medicaid eligibility, alleging that wealthy elderly couples were using asset transfers
and trusts to pass their wealth to their children without paying for long-term
nursing home care. The true motive behind the long-term care industry’s efforts
was the desire to increase the sale of private long-term care insurance. Rein, supra
note 17, at 261. As described supra, in Section I, most older Americans do not
have significant resources to pass to their children, and indeed, the few who have
such wealth utilize their resources to pay for home and community based longterm care services.
109. Gruber v. Ohio Dep’t of Human Serv., 647 N.E.2d 861, 868 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1994); Kimnach v. Ohio Dep’t of Human Serv., 645 N.E.2d 825, 827 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1994); Wisconsin Dep’t. of Health & Family Serv. v. Blumer, 615 N.W.2d
647, 655 (Wis. 2000), reversed, 534 U.S. 473, 122 S. Ct. 962 (2002).
110. See id.
111. See id.
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112

procedure is permissible.
Then the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to review the decision of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals in
Blumer, which had held that the language of the statute mandated
113
the “resources first” approach.
IV. IN BLUMER, THE SUPREME COURT FAILED TO UPHOLD THE CLEAR
LANGUAGE AND LEGISLATIVE INTENT OF MCCA
The majority opinion in Blumer, constituting the views of six of
the Justices, was written by Justice Ginsberg. The crux of the
opinion is that the term “community spouse’s income” in 42 U.S.C.
section 1396r-5(e)(2)(C) does not mean the income “actually
114
possessed by” the community spouse.
Instead, according to the
majority opinion, the term “community spouse’s income” includes
income that is possessed by the institutionalized spouse and
115
attributed to the community spouse by the state. The Court did
not even suggest that any specific language of MCCA or the
legislative history of MCCA supported its dismissal of the plain
116
meaning of the term “community spouse’s income.” Instead, the
opinion listed two citations in support of its conclusion that the
community spouse’s income includes the institutionalized spouse’s
income. First, the Court cited a treatise on grammar for the
proposition that a “possessor nominal does not necessarily possess
(in the everyday, legalistic sense of the term) the entity denoted by
117
the possessee.” The second citation is to a prior Supreme Court
case which “question[ed the] characterization of a statutory term as
unambiguous when its meaning has generated a division of
118
opinion in the lower courts.”
In essence the Court ruled that
since some, but not all, lower courts had ignored the plain
meaning of the text, the text must be ambiguous.
The Court acknowledged the argument that the statute
requires the revision of the CSRA prior to a determination of
112. See Cleary v. Waldman, 167 F.3d 801, 808 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S.
870 (1999); Chambers v. Ohio Dep’t of Human Servs., 145 F.3d 793, 802 (6th
Cir.), cert denied, 525 U.S. 964 (1998).
113. 534 U.S. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 972.
114. Id. (emphasis in original).
115. Id. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 974.
116. Id.
117. Id. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 972 (citing J. TAYLOR, POSSESSIVES IN ENGLISH: AN
EXPLORATION IN COGNITIVE GRAMMAR 2 (1996)).
118. Id. (citing Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 739
(1996)).
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eligibility but permits the attribution of the institutionalized
spouse’s income to the community spouse only after a
119
determination of eligibility. The Court responded by concluding
that since the fair hearing would consider the post-eligibility
situation of the couple, specifically whether the community spouse
had a sufficient monthly income allowance to meet the MMMNA,
therefore, the state could conduct the post-eligibility income
120
attribution calculation prior to a determination of eligibility. The
only case law cited by the Court in support of permitting posteligibility income attributions prior to a determination of eligibility
121
was Schweiker v. Gray Panthers. The Court cited the case for the
“background principle that ‘it is proper to expect spouses to
support each other’” and quoted legislative history from the
122
establishment of the Medicaid program in 1965.
Thus, the
Court’s decision completely disregarded not only the clear
language of MCCA regarding pre- and post-eligibility
determinations but also the legislative history of MCCA, which
expressed Congressional intent to end spousal impoverishment.
Moreover, the Court’s characterization of the legislative history
of the original enactment of Medicaid is misleading. In 1965,
“Medicaid was simply tacked on as an afterthought to the Medicare
program,” with virtually all debate focusing on the Medicare
123
program.
There was hardly any attention paid in 1965 to
124
Medicaid coverage of nursing home care, and the Medicaid
program was “part of a last-minute scramble to cobble together the
Medicaid Act’s provisions” based on existing legislation, “which
125
involved little or no debate.” The 1965 Senate Report described
Medicaid as an extension and improvement of the Kerr-Mills
126
medical assistance for the aged program, authorized in 1960.
Kerr-Mills had provided “some institutionalized care” for the
elderly, while the 1965 “improvements” required coverage for
127
skilled nursing home services.
The 1965 Senate Report’s
119. Id. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 972-73.
120. Id. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 973-74.
121. Id. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 974 (citing Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S.
34, 45 (1981)).
122. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, p. 78 (1965)).
123. Rein, supra note 17, at 257.
124. Id. at 258.
125. Id.
126. S. REP. NO. 404, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965), reprinted in 1965
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1950, 2014.
127. Id. at 1951.
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discussion of the obligation of spouses to support each other, cited
by the Blumer court, did not contain any references to spouses
residing in institutions, but rather applied to the entire Medicaid
128
program. There certainly was no discussion in 1965 of whether
income attributions to the community spouse would occur pre- or
post-eligibility, since the income attribution provision was added to
Medicaid in 1988, when Congress explicitly sought “to protect at129
home spouses from impoverishment.”
In sum, the Court ruled that the text of MCCA did not mean
what the words said but rather its meaning was to be interpreted in
accordance with the legislative history of a different statute than
the one being implemented. After dismissing both the text and
legislative history of MCCA, the Court readily concluded that
HHS’s preliminary determination that MCCA permits “income
130
first” was “not . . . unreasonable.” The Court stated that HHS’s
position, as embodied in proposed regulations that were not
131
finalized, “warrants respectful consideration.”
The Court noted that since MCCA gave states “large
discretion” in setting the MMMNA and the CSRA, therefore the
statute did not indicate that additional discretion with regard to
132
“income first” was “inappropriate.” The Court’s reasoning is truly
frightening. Many federal entitlement programs operate by giving
states broad discretion with regard to some variables but requiring
states to adhere to strict federal requirements in other matters.
The High Court justified gutting the “resources first” provision of
MCCA by noting that the statute deferred to state choice in other
133
provisions of the statute.
Notably, the Blumer Court did not cite or rely on the case of
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, in which the Supreme Court had
stated: “If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the
matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
134
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Instead, the Court
135
136
cited United States v. Mead, Thomas Jefferson University v. Shalala,
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. at 2018, cited by Blumer, 534 U.S. 473, ___, 122 S.Ct. 962, 974 (2002).
Rein, supra note 17, at 258.
Blumer, 534 U.S. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 973.
Id. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 976.
Id.
Id. at___, 122 S. Ct. at 975.
467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
533 U.S. 218, 227-28 (2001).
512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994).
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138

and Schweiker v. Gray Panthers. As noted supra, Gray Panthers was
decided before MCCA was passed, and therefore is of little
relevance to the validity of the Secretary’s interpretation of MCCA.
In Mead, the Court held that the Chevron deference was not
warranted and remanded the case for consideration, pursuant to
139
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., of whether the agency’s position was
140
persuasive.
Yet, the Blumer majority did not state that the
agency’s position permitting “income first” was persuasive. The
Blumer decision characterized the government’s position as not
141
“unreasonable” and not “inappropriate.”
A reasonableness
standard is far more deferential to the agency than a persuasiveness
standard, and thus the Court expanded upon prior precedent,
granting the agency enormous power in interpreting legislation.
Blumer cites Thomas Jefferson University for the proposition of
deferring to the Secretary’s significant expertise in interpreting a
142
complex and technical regulatory program.
Thomas Jefferson
University did not concern interpretation of statutory language but
rather addressed the agency’s interpretation of its own regulation,
which the Court reviewed under the standard that the agency’s
143
interpretation would be upheld unless it was “plainly erroneous.”
In Blumer, the Court extended the “not erroneous” or “not
unreasonable” standard to the context of an agency’s
144
interpretation of Congressional mandates and intent.
Interestingly, Thomas Jefferson University was a five to four decision,
in which the dissent written by Justice Thomas derided the majority
145
for ignoring the “plain meaning” of the relevant regulation.
Similarly, the dissent in Blumer, written by Justice Stevens and
joined by Justices Scalia and O’Connor, criticized the majority for
ignoring the plain text of the statute. For instance, the dissent
stated, “Rather than admitting that its reading strains the text of
146
the MCCA, the Court engages in an analytical sleight of hand.”
The dissent also pointed out that the majority’s decision violated
137. Blumer, 534 U.S at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 976.
138. See supra, notes 121-22 and accompanying text.
139. 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
140. Mead, 533 U.S. at 234-39.
141. Blumer, 534 U.S. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 973, 976.
142. Id. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 976.
143. Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512-13 (1994).
144. Id. at 525 (Steven, J., dissenting).
145. Id. at 518 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justices Stevens, O’Connor, and
Ginsburg joined the dissent. See id.
146. Blumer, 534 U.S. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 978.
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MCCA’s requirement that, post-eligibility, income is defined as
147
“available” only to the spouse whose name is on the check. The
dissent further noted that the majority expressed the opinion that
the “income first” method is a better policy choice than the
“resources first” method, and the dissent berated the majority for
148
ignoring the policy choice made by Congress.
The majority stated that if states are required to expend
greater funds on Medicaid for long-term care, due to the federal
requirement to utilize the “resources first” method, then the states
“would have little choice but to offset the greater expense of the
resources-first method” by reducing expenditures on other
149
recipients within the bounds of federal law. The Court further
suggested that applicants “whose assets exceed the formula
resource allowance” are not worthy of the expenditure of these
150
funds.
The Court’s reasoning displays callous disregard for the
impoverishment of older Americans, particularly older women,
who lose a lifetime of savings when their spouses are beset by
disabling impairments that require nursing home care. The Court
demonstrated insensitivity to the plight of many older Americans
who are on the edge of poverty and are pushed into the chasm of
despair by the exorbitant costs of long-term care.
The Court did not provide any citations in support of its
assumption that if states are forced to comply with the plain
meaning of the statute they will “have little choice” but to penalize
other Medicaid recipients, “by reducing the MMMNA or the
151
standard CSRA.”
The Court fails to consider that states have
many other means of reducing Medicaid expenditures, such as
cutting nursing home reimbursement rates, reducing the supply of
nursing home beds, expanding the role of managed care and
capitated payments to long-term care providers, and utilizing tax
incentives to encourage people to purchase long-term care
152
insurance.
The Court’s presumption that states will not spend additional
dollars to prevent the pauperization of older Americans is self-

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Id. at 959 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-5(b)(2)(A)(i)).
Id. at 979.
Id. at 976.
Id. at 976-77.
Id. at 976.
STATE COST CONTAINMENT, supra note 22, at CRS-15, CRS-19, CRS-22.
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prophesying. Now that the Court has ruled that states are free to
reduce their Medicaid expenditures by ignoring the requirement
to calculate “resources-first,” the Court has encouraged states to
minimize their Medicaid expenditures without worrying about the
plain meaning of the Medicaid Act.
V. CONCLUSION
The legislative history of MCCA included the expression of
outrage at the need for spouses to become divorced in order to
153
protect the financial survival of the community spouse.
By
eliminating the “resources first” rule from the Medicaid statute, the
Blumer Court has increased the likelihood that couples will be
forced to divorce in order for the community spouse to retain
sufficient resources to provide a basic level of income to her after
154
the death of her institutionalized husband.
In Blumer, the use of the “resources-first” approach would have
meant an additional $15,000 in resources to be kept by Mr.
155
Blumer. The additional economic assistance provided by a small
increase in assets and income generated from those assets is
essential to maintaining some measure of independence and
dignity for the community spouse. The Blumer decision is a
disturbing development for all but the wealthiest Americans.
Middle class citizens whose economic survival is contingent upon
the protections of the Medicaid statute are clearly at risk of
pauperization under the Court’s damaging decision.

153. See supra pp. 14-18.
154. See William J. Browning, Recent U.S. Supreme Court Decision Will Lead to More
Divorces Among the Elderly, PROBATE L.J. OF OHIO ___(forthcoming 2002).
155. 534 U.S. at ___, 122 S. Ct. at 972.
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